Proposes a new theory of Senate agenda setting that reconciles a divide in literature between the conventional wisdom a in which party power is thought to be mostly undermined by Senate procedures and norms a and the apparent partisan bias in Senate decisions noted in recent empirical studies. Chris Den Hartog and Nathan W. Monroe's theory revolves around a 'costly consideration' framework for thinking about agenda setting, where moving proposals forward through the legislative process is seen as requiring scarce resources. To establish that the majority party pays lower agenda consideration costs through various procedural advantages, the book features a number of chapters examining partisan influence at several stages of the legislative process, including committee reports, filibusters and cloture, floor scheduling and floor amendments. Not only do the results support the book's theoretical assumption and key hypotheses, but they shed new light on virtually every major step in the Senate's legislative process.That is, though the literature now broadly acknowledges rising partisanship in the Senate, many scholars still view the chamber as fundamentally individualistic. ... on Senate leadership to deliver partisan advantage in a chamber set up to empower individual interests (Sinclair 2001a). ... resulted in either gridlock ( Binder 1999, 2003; Smith 2005) or compromise (Oppenheimer and Hetherington 2008).
|Title||:||Agenda Setting in the U.S. Senate|
|Author||:||Chris Den Hartog, Nathan W. Monroe|
|Publisher||:||Cambridge University Press - 2011-05-16|