In September 2011, scientists announced new experimental findings that would not only threaten the conduct and publication of influenza research, but would have significant policy and intelligence implications. The findings presented a modified variant of the H5N1 avian influenza virus (hereafter referred to as the H5N1 virus) that was transmissible via aerosol between ferrets. These results suggested a worrisome possibility: the existence of a new airborne and highly lethal H5N1 virus that could cause a deadly global pandemic. In response, a series of international discussions on the nature of dual-use life science arose. These discussions addressed the complex social, technical, political, security, and ethical issues related to dual-use research. This Research Topic will be devoted to contributions that explore this matrix of issues from a variety of case study and international perspectives.... de Wit E, Munster VJ, et al. Airborne transmission of influenza A/H5N1 virus between ferrets. ... Technical Consultation on H5N1 Research Issues a Consensus Points. Geneva: ... Secur Dialogue (2007) 38(4):411a434. doi: 10.1177/0967010607084994 Tucker JB. Historical trends ... Risk Assessment. London: www.frontiersin.org July 2014 |Volume 2 | Article 74|19 Rappert Why little research of concern?
|Title||:||Dual-use life science research and biosecurity in the 21st Century: Social, Technical, Policy, and Ethical Challenges|
|Author||:||Jonathan E. Suk, Kathleen M. Vogel, Amanda Jane Ozin|