I have also analyzed the economic demand response program offered by PJM. PJM's program provided subsidies to customers who reduced load in response to price signals before 2008. The program incorporated a qtrigger pointq, set at a locational marginal price of $75/MWh, at or beyond which payments for load reduction included a subsidy payment. Particularly during peak hours, such a program saves money for the system, but the subsidies involved may introduce distortions into the market, I have simulated demand-side bidding into the PJM market, and compare the economic welfare gains with the subsidies paid to price-responsive load using load and price data for year 2006. The largest economic effect is wealth transfers from generators to non price-responsive loads. Based on the incentive payment structure that was in effect through the end of 2007, I estimate that the social welfare gains exceeded the subsidies during 2006. Lowering the trigger point increases the transfer from generators to consumers, but may result in the subsidy outweighing the social welfare gains due to load curtailment.I have also analyzed the economic demand response program offered by PJM. PJMa#39;s program provided subsidies to customers who reduced load in response to price signals before 2008.
|Title||:||Economics of Emerging Electric Energy Storage Technologies and Demand Response in Deregulated Electricity Markets|
|Author||:||Rahul S. Walawalkar|
|Publisher||:||ProQuest - 2008|