Information asymmetries play an important role in determining the behavior of market participants in a wide variety of markets. In a series of essays I investigate two classic phenomena that arise in such markets, information disclosure and signaling. The first essay is a case study of a large online used car market, eBay Motors. I demonstrate empirically that sellers selectively disclose their private information to potential buyers, so that the amount of information disclosed is positively correlated with the quality of the vehicle. The second essay provides a framework for estimating consumer preferences from aggregate cross-sectional data when there is uncertainty over product quality. Instead of assuming perfect information. I consider the behavioral hypothesis that consumers infer quality from product characteristics such as price and brand. The main contribution is an identification result that characterizes the conditions under which the intrinsic and informative effects of product characteristics may be separately identified. The third essay considers a two-sided matching game between colleges and students that models the college admissions process. Conditions sufficient for positive assortive matching are provided, and the model is applied to the question of race based admissions.... the Honda Accord and Civic, and one consisting solely of pickup trucks (such as the Ford F Series and GM Silverado). ... on transmission, which presumably reflects a preference for manual transmission when driving a Corvette or Mustang , anbsp;...
|Title||:||Essays on choice and matching under information asymmetry|
|Author||:||Gregory M. Lewis, University of Michigan|