These experts in the field challenge commonly held views about the success of the global war on terrorism and its campaign in Afghanistan. Their book questions some fundamentals of the population-centric COIN doctrine currently in vogue and harshly criticizes key decisions about the prosecution of the Afghan war. It is the only book to compare the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan from a national strategic perspective. It questions several key operational factors in Afghanistan, including the decision to give NATO the lead, the performance of both civilian and military leaders, and the prosecution of an Iraq War-style surge. It also contrasts the counterinsurgency campaign styles and the leadership of senior American officials in both Iraq and Afghanistan. A final chapter outlines key lessons of the two campaigns.Resignation, a New York Times, April 14, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/ 14/washington/14military.html? ... Itcan be foundat http://www.aei.org/docLib/ 20070105_ChoosingVictoryFINALcc.pdf 58. ... During the sameperiodinlate 1983 and early 1984 DonaldRumsfeld servedasPresident Reagana#39;s special envoy to the Middle East and ... U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, Field Manual 10020/Air ForcePublication 320 (Washington, D.C. , anbsp;...
|Title||:||From Kabul to Baghdad and Back|
|Author||:||John Ballard, David Lamm, John Wood|
|Publisher||:||Naval Institute Press - 2012-10-12|