The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds. Professor Shoemaker opposes the qinner senseq conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have nonrepresentational features--qqualiaq--that determine what it is like to have them. Among the other topics covered are the unity of consciousness, and the idea that the qfirst-person perspectiveq gives a privileged route to philosophical understanding of the nature of mind.But it is held to be conceivable that in different persons, or the same person at different times, the same qualitative ... the requirements of the object-perception model of introspection that is not satisfied by introspective awareness of beliefs andanbsp;...
|Title||:||The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays|
|Publisher||:||Cambridge University Press - 1996-09-13|